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HIS Article reviews judicial developments in Texas environmental
law between October 1, 1991 and October 1, 1992. The State Legis-
lature was in session only briefly during this period and did not en-
act or amend any environmental legislation, thus, no new legislation is
discussed.
In the most important environmental case decided during this period, a
district court invalidated Texas Water Commission (TWC) rules that would
have regulated the use of water from the Edwards Aquifer in central Texas.I
The TWC issued these rules after four decades of negotiations among the
parties that failed to resolve the disputes regarding the proper management
of the aquifer. 2 In addition to this case, other environmental cases are dis-
cussed in this article, but the outcomes of several were determined, not by
substantive law, but by the failure of the parties to preserve error at trial3 or
to produce a record on appeal.4 Finally, the applicability of a recent crimi-
nal case may also be limited because the statute under which the defendant
was convicted has been amended. 5
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. DISTRICT COURT INVALIDATES TEXAS WATER COMMISSION (TWC)
RULES ON THE EDWARDS AQUIFER
On April 15, 1992, the TWC, under emergency provisions of the Open
Meetings Act 6 and the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act,7
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laude. Shareholder, Thompson & Knight, P.C., Dallas.
** B.A. George Washington University; M.A., Ph.D. State University of New York at
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1. McFadin v. Texas Water Comm'n, No. 92-05214 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 331
Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 2, 1992).
2. Tex. Water Comm'n, 17 Tex. Reg. 2913, 2914 (1992) (emerg. amendment to 31 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 298.1-.6).
3. See, e.g., Barras v. Monsanto Co., 831 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, writ denied).
4. Fort Bend County v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Comm'n, 818 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1991, no writ).
5. Southwest Utilities, Inc. v. State, 822 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992,
pet. ref'd).
6. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
7. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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declared the Edwards Aquifer in Kinney, Uvalde, Medina, Atascosa, Bexar,
Comal and Hays Counties to be an underground river, and its waters to be
State water.8 The TWC's emergency rules were published in the Texas Reg-
ister on April 24, 1992.9 The TWC emergency rules declared a moratorium
on the drilling of new wells into the Edwards Aquifer by any person for any
purpose other than livestock or domestic use. 10 On the same day, the TWC
also proposed permanent rules in the Texas Register."1 These rules were
designed to permanently establish the Commission's emergency declaration
that the Edwards Aquifer is an underground river and required all well own-
ers to file applications for permits with the TWC by September 1, 1992.
The significance of these rules is that if upheld, for the first time in Texas
history, the waters of an aquifer would be considered State water subject to
TWC regulation pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Texas Water Code.12 The
TWC's position states that under Texas law, all water below the surface of
the land is presumed to be percolating groundwater, which is owned by the
landowner, unless it is established that the water is in an underground
stream or the underflow of a surface stream. 13 The TWC argues that if such
water can be characterized as an underground stream, then it should be gov-
erned by surface water law and subject to regulation by the TWC as State
water. 14
Suit was brought in the District Court of Travis County seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the emergency and proposed permanent rules were inva-
lid as a matter of law. 15 District Judge Pete Lowry granted the plaintiffs
summary judgment motion and declared the TWC's rules void. 16 In support
of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff asserted the following in-
dependent bases: (1) the TWC has no legal authority to declare and adjudi-
cate private property rights of owners of land overlying the Edwards
Aquifer; (2) the TWC has no legal authority to declare the status of the
Edwards Aquifer, or any other aquifer, to be an underground river and
hence State water, and no authority generally to declare any underground
river or stream;(3) as a matter of law, the Edwards Aquifer is groundwater,
not an underground river or stream; (4)the actions of the TWC in declaring
the Edwards Aquifer an underground river and hence State water are uncon-
stitutional, for violation of the principle of separation of powers and as an
unconstitutional taking without due process and without compensation; (5)
the TWC is barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel from
declaring the Edwards Aquifer to be an underground river and hence State
water.
8. Tex. Water Comm'n, 17 Tex. Reg. 2913-14 (1992).
9. Tex. Water Comm'n, 17 Tex. Reg. 2913-17 (1992).
10. Id.
11. Tex. Water Comm'n, 17 Tex. Reg. 2949-67 (1992).
12. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.001-.506 (Vernon 1992).
13. Tex. Water Comm'n, 17 Tex. Reg. 2913 (1992).
14. Id.
15. McFadin v. Texas Water Comm'n, No. 92-05214 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 331st




The summary judgment order does not state the specific grounds on
which it was granted; thus, to prevail on appeal, the TWC must show that
none of the independent arguments alleged in the motion is sufficient to sup-
port the order. 17 In addition, it is likely that this very controversial issue
will be the subject of extensive legislative debate during the 1993 legislative
session.
B. DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT DEFENSE REQUIRES SHOWING
NOT ONLY SINGLING OUT OF DEFENDANT FOR
PROSECUTION, BUT ALSO THAT THE SINGLING
OUT WAS BASED ON IMPERMISSIBLE
CONSIDERATIONS
In the only Texas Supreme Court case reviewed that relates to environ-
mental matters, State v. Malone Service Company,'8 a defendant in the suit
by the State, brought on behalf of the Texas Water Commission (TWC),
asserted the defense of discriminatory enforcement. The court rejected this
claim because the defendant failed to demonstrate not only that it was sin-
gled out for enforcement, but also that the government had purposely sin-
gled the party out based on impermissible considerations.' 9
1. Background
In 1977 the Texas Department of Water Resources (TDWR), the prede-
cessor agency to the TWC, issued an administrative order prohibiting Ma-
lone Service Company (Malone) from using an earthen pit for waste
management after an eighteen-month grace period. 20 Nonetheless, Malone
continued to use the earthen pit and in 1983, Malone and the TDWR en-
tered into a compliance agreement withholding statutory enforcement if Ma-
lone closed the earthen pit within one year.2 1 In 1986, because Malone
continued to use the earthen pit, the State, upon request by the TWC,
brought suit against Malone and other parties, including the president and
plant manager (collectively Malone). The State alleged that despite the com-
pliance agreement, Malone continued to discharge hazardous waste into the
earthen pit in violation of the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA)22
and the Texas Injection Well Act.23 As part of its defense, Malone asserted
that the enforcement action constituted discriminatory enforcement because
the State was motivated solely to benefit one of Malone's competitors. Ma-
lone's competitor was Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority (Gulf Coast), a
political subdivision created by the Texas legislature in 1969 to help develop
a regional water quality management program in Chambers, Galveston, and
17. See David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 20 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 243, 282 (1989).
18. 829 S.W. 2d 763 (Tex. 1992).
19. Id. at 766.
20. Id. at 765.
21. Id.
22. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.001-.510 (Vernon 1992).




At trial, Malone attempted to offer as evidence of discriminatory enforce-
ment, a TWC computer-generated log listing hundreds of companies against
which the TWC sought enforcement under the TSWDA. With this evi-
dence, Malone attempted to show that the TWC took enforcement action
against only four of the six companies who were customers and investors of
Gulf Coast and assessed no penalty against these six companies, even though
the TWC classified these companies as large polluters. The State success-
fully convinced the trial court to exclude the columns in the log styled, Pen-
alty Assessed, Penalty Collected, and Scheduled Compliance. Malone,
however, was able to elicit testimony from TWC employees that all six com-
panies had been subject to enforcement short of a lawsuit, that the State did
not close down any of these companies' operations, and that none of the
officers or directors of the companies had been fined for violations of envi-
ronmental statutes. 25
Based on this evidence, the jury found that the TWC had not intentionally
discriminated in the enforcement of its regulations against Malone. 26 Based
upon the jury's verdict, the district court rendered a judgment against Ma-
lone of $2,403,900, against the company's president of $627,000, and against
the company's plant manager of $22,000.27 The court of appeals reversed
the district court, holding that the evidence should have been admitted. 28
2. Discriminatory Enforcement Doctrine
The Supreme Court of Texas began its analysis by stating that the discrim-
inatory enforcement defense is based on equal protection guaranteed under
the United States and Texas constitutions. 29 The court further stated that
although the defense originated in the context of criminal proceedings, it
also applies to civil proceedings involving State action.30 In addition, the
court stated that in order to establish a claim of discriminatory enforcement
a two-part test must be met: (a) that the defendant "has been singled out for
prosecution while others similarly situated and committing the same acts
have not," and (b) "that the government has purposefully discriminated on
the basis of such impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the
desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. '31
In terms of the evidence that may be admitted to prove discriminatory
enforcement, the supreme court applied basic evidentiary rules. First, evi-
24. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7621d-2 (Vernon 1992).
25. Malone, 829 S.W.2d at 766.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Malone Service Co. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 174, 174 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991), rev'd, 829 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1992).
29. Malone, 829 S.W.2d at 766 (citing the U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, the TEX.
CONST. art. I § 3, and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
30. Id. (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 71-76, 161 S.W.2d 1022,
1025-28 (1942), and Colorado River W. Ry. v. Texas & Orleans R.R. Co., 283 S.W.2d 768,
776-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
31. Id. at 766.
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dence will generally be properly admitted as relevant to the defense if it
tends to show either that the party was singled out or that the government
has taken enforcement action on the basis of impermissible considerations. 32
If the evidence is relevant, however, it can be excluded "if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, confusion of the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." s33 Assumedly based on these
principles, the court reviewed Malone's position that the government took a
strong enforcement action against Malone while taking little or no action
against companies associated with Gulf Coast and considered the exclusion
of part of the TWC computer log as evidence. The court ruled that this
evidence might tend to show the singling out of Malone, but it would not
demonstrate "the government has purposely discriminated on the basis of
impermissible considerations."'34
The court stated that regulatory agencies must be allowed broad discre-
tion. 35 Furthermore, the enforcement actions of the agency are presumed to
be non-discriminatory even where a private party has sought enforcement
for its own self interest.36 With this heavy burden to be met, the court con-
cluded that Malone failed to show either that any benefit to Gulf Coast
would flow directly to the state or that the state's action was based on race,
religion or any other impermissible motivation. 37 Therefore, as a matter of
law, the evidence offered by Malone was insufficient to show discriminatory
enforcement.38 Because the evidence alone could not establish discrimina-
tory enforcement, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the penalty amounts in the enforcement log, and
overruled the lower appellate court. 39
The concurring opinion by Justice Gonzalez provides a better description
of why it is improper to allow evidence regarding penalties imposed in ear-
lier, but related cases. Justice Gonzalez argues that such penalties are irrele-
vant to the case before the court. Moreover, if prior cases were allowed to be
presented, the State would be required to "re-try unrelated cases." 4 Fur-
thermore, absent the establishment of a prima facie case of selective enforce-
ment, the trial court should not allow such evidence to be presented, and the
determination of a prima facie case should be made outside of the hearing of
the jury.41
32. Id. at 767 (citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 401).
33. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 403).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Retail Merchants Ass'n. of Houston, Inc. v. Handy Dan Hardware, Inc.,
696 S.W.2d 44, 53 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ), and SS Kresge Co. v. State,




40. Id. at 769.
41. Id. at 770.
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C. CHEMICAL MANUFACTURER NOT LIABLE ON A THEORY OF STRICT
LIABILITY ON THE BASIS OF ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS
ACTIVITIES
In Barras v. Monsanto Co. ,42 the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in
Houston held that even though the trial court determined, as a matter of
law, that a chemical manufacturer's (Monsanto's) activities were abnormally
dangerous, homeowners could not recover their damages from Monsanto. 43
The court gave two rationales for its holding: (1) Texas law does not recog-
nize the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities as a basis for strict lia-
bility, and (2) the jury did not find the manufacturer to be negligent or find
that any of its activities were a producing cause of the homeowners' or the
homebuilders' damages.44
After a four-month trial and a week of deliberation, the jury concluded
that Monsanto was not negligent and had not engaged in any abnormally
dangerous activity. 45 The trial court, however, granted the homeowners'
motion to disregard the jury's negative answer, holding that Monsanto had
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity as a matter of law.46 Mon-
santo did not appeal that ruling. The homeowners and the homebuilders,
however, appealed, attacking the jury's answers to negligence and strict lia-
bility issues47 and the use of Mary Carter agreements. 48
1. Background
In 1957, Monsanto promised Charles Hard and Ralph Lowe $50,000 if
within 90 days they could successfully regenerate 100,000 pounds of spent
copper from wastes that Monsanto generated in the manufacture of acryloni-
trile. The Hard-Lowe Chemical Company succeeded in the project and
Monsanto became its first customer for refining and reprocessing chemical
by-products. From 1957 to 1982, Hard-Lowe and its successors dumped
toxic wastes from these projects into unlined pits on land next to property
later occupied by plaintiff-homeowners. In October 1984, because of the
toxic waste dumping, the federal government placed the plant site on the
National Priorities List and it became known as the Brio Superfund Site,
after the last company to operate the plant.
42. 831 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
43. Id. at 859.
44. Id. at 865.
45. Id. at 859.
46. Id.
47. The homeowners raised 247 points of error on appeal; the builders raised 25.
48. The court describes a Mary Carter agreement as an agreement between a plaintiff and
one or more, but not all defendants whereby the parties limit the financial responsibility of the
settling defendants. Barras, 831 S.W.2d at 861 n. 1. Because the settlement is reduced propor-
tionately to the amount that the plaintiff recovers from the nonsettling defendants, a Mary
Carter agreement offers the settling defendants an inducement to assist in the plaintiff's case.
Id. There was an ongoing debate in Texas over whether evidence of Mary Carter agreements
should be admitted at trial, and for what purposes that evidence should be admitted. Id. at
864. Recently, however, the Texas Supreme Court held Mary Carter agreements void as
against public policy. See Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1992).
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The homeowners claimed that Monsanto's dumping of toxic waste at the
site resulted in the loss of market value to the homeowners' properties. In
addition, because of the toxic wastes, the homeowners alleged that they suf-
fered from physical pain, mental anguish, and that they needed future medi-
cal monitoring. The homeowners and the homebuilders charged that
instead of disclosing what it knew about the danger of the Brio site, Mon-
santo, working through a task force of potentially responsible parties, en-
couraged people to move into the subdivision.
2. Strict Liability and Negligence Claims
The jury found that Monsanto had not engaged in an abnormally danger-
ous activity and was not negligent. The trial court granted the homeowners'
motion to disregard the jury's negative answer to the strict liability issue and
held that an affirmative response was established as a matter of law.49 Mon-
santo did not appeal that ruling, but it also did not admit that its activities
were a producing cause of the homeowners' injuries.
The court of appeals noted that federal law identifies materials stored or
disposed of at the site as hazardous substances.50 Under the Restatement
Second of Torts (Restatement), strict liability is imposed on one who carries
on an abnormally dangerous activity. The Restatement provides:
(a) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting
from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent
the harm.
(b) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous. 51
The court held, however, that Texas has not adopted Section 19 of the Re-
statement.5 2 "[O]ur courts have rejected the doctrine of abnormally danger-
ous activities as a basis for strict liability. In the absence of some other
showing, such as negligence, there is no basis for recovery."' 53
The court identified an additional, independent reason for its decision: the
jury's answer on the question of damages. Question Number Four asked
whether Monsanto's activity in regard to the Brio site was abnormally dan-
gerous, and the jury answered "No."'54 The next question was a conditional
one. It asked whether such activity was a producing cause of damages to the
homeowners and builders if the jury answered yes to Question Four. Thus the
jury did not reach the question on producing cause. The court of appeals
held that the homeowners' and homebuilders' failed to object to the form of
the question at trial, and thus waived their objection.55 Thus, although the
trial court held as a matter of law that Monsanto's activities were abnor-
49. Id. at 859.
50. Id. at 865.
51. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (1990)).






mally dangerous, the appellants could not recover because the jury did not
find Monsanto's activities to be a producing cause of the appellants'
damages.
On the negligence cause of action, the jury attributed 100% of the negli-
gence to the developers. The court of appeals held that the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's finding that Monsanto was not negligent and
that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of 100% liability on
the part of the developers for creating a residential subdivision at that loca-
tion.56 This is because (1) the developers created the subdivision next to a
remote chemical plant whose operations were open and obvious; (2) they
failed to inform potential home buyers that the plant stored chemical by-
products in pits located on the premises; (3) the developers' own environ-
mental impact statement put them on notice of styrene tars emitting un-
pleasant odors from the plant; and (4) the Texas Department of Water
Resources notified the developers that waste material at the Brio site was
surfacing and migrating toward the proposed subdivision.
3. The Mary Carter Agreement
The homebuilders also attacked the use of the Mary Carter agreement at
trial. The court of appeals rejected these points of error because the
homebuilders failed to preserve error at trial.57 At a pretrial hearing on mo-
tions in limine, the homeowners and homebuilders argued that (1) the agree-
ments should not be introduced until after voir dire and opening statements,
(2) the amount of the agreements should not be disclosed, and (3) the agree-
ments should not be used to impeach the testimony of the homeowners.
Counsel for the homebuilders, however, stated that his clients were not a
party to the agreements.
The next day the trial judge announced her intention to disclose the agree-
ments in the initial part of voir dire by making a statement informing the
jury of the relationship and alignment of the parties, and admitting the
formula, but not the amount of the agreements. In her statement, the judge
incorrectly described the homebuilders as a party to the agreements. Coun-
sel for the homebuilders failed to object, and did not object until a point that
the court of appeals described as 800 pages into the Statement of Facts. At
that time, the trial judge instructed Monsanto's attorney to explain to the
jury that the homebuilders were not a party to the Mary Carter Agreement.
The court of appeals held that the interchange at the pretrial hearing did
not preserve error; a timely objection at trial was required.58 The
homebuilders, however, waived error at trial; at each point they either
waived error by not objecting or by failing to follow up a sustained objection
with a request for an instruction to disregard.
56. Id. at 867.
57. Id. at 859.
58. Id. at 864.
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D. CATTLE-FEEDING OPERATION WITHIN THE TACB's JURISDICTION
UNDER THE TEXAS CLEAN AIR ACT
In State v. F/R Cattle Co.,59 F/R Cattle Company opened a calf-feeding
facility in Erath County. The company picked up baby calves on a daily
basis from dairies in the area. These calves were kept at the facility for about
110 to 120 days. When the one-day-old calves arrived, they were placed in
cage-like wooden hutches, where they remained for about sixty days. Three
calves were placed in each hutch. After about sixty days the calves were
placed in small weaning pens. The Eastland court of appeals held that, with-
out regard to location, it was abnormal or unusual to concentrate 6000 baby
calves in 1500 small hutches and in weaning pens.6° Thus, the odor at the
defendant's calf-feeding facility was not producied by natural processes and
the TACB had jurisdiction under the Texas Clean Air Act.61
The TACB received numerous complaints of the facility's odor which was
described as "putrid," "sour," "rancid," and like an "open sewer pit." The
State of Texas sued F/R Cattle Company on behalf of the TACB alleging
that the odors violated the Texas Clean Air Act.62 The district court held
that the TACB did not have jurisdiction under the Texas Clean Air Act and
dismissed the State's petition.63 The district court decided that the odors
were produced by a natural process. This was apparently because the area in
which the calf-feeding facility is located was described as a rural agricultural
area and a residential retirement area, with many diaries located in the vicin-
ity. There was also evidence, however, that the F/R facility was "the only
one of its kind in Texas." 64 The district court made the following findings of
fact:
16. Defendant's calf operation is normal, usual and natural in the area
and locality where it is situated.
17. Any odor resulting from Defendant's operation is odor produced
from a process that occurs in nature, and is affected or controlled by
human devices only to an extent normal and usual in the vicinity.65
The district court cited language contained in Europak, Inc. v. County of
Hunt6 6 and Southwest Livestock and Trucking Company v. Texas Air Control
Board67 for its conclusion that the natural process exclusion in the Texas
Clean Air Act deprived the Board of jurisdiction. Europak and Southwest
59. 828 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ granted).
60. Id.
61. Id. The purpose of the Texas Clean Air Act is "to safeguard the state's air resources
from pollution and emissions of air contaminants .... TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 382.002 (Vernon 1992) (emphasis added). "Air contaminant" is defined as: "particulate
matter, radioactive material, dust, fumes, gas, mist, smoke, vapor, or odor, including any com-
bination of those items, produced by processes other than natural." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 382.003(2) (Vernon 1992), quoted in F/R Cattle Company, 828 S.W.2d at 305
(emphasis added).
62. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 382.001-.141 (Vernon 1992).
63. FIR Cattle Co., 828 S.W.2d at 303.
64. Id. at 305.
65. Id.
66. 507 S.W.2d 884, 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
67. 579 S.W.2d 549, 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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Livestock, however, had both upheld the authority of the TACB in similar
situations. In Europak, the court rejected the defendant's argument that no
TACB permit was required because the odor of manure that would be emit-
ted from a proposed horse slaughtering and packing plant would be pro-
duced from natural processes. 68 In Southwest Livestock, the court upheld a
TACB order finding a livestock-holding facility in violation of the Texas
Clean Air Act because of the offensive odors emitted from the facility.69
In both cases, the location of the facilities indicated that the odors were
not produced by natural processes within the meaning of the exclusion. In
Europak, the Dallas court of appeals held that "[a] natural process is one
that occurs in nature and is affected or controlled by human devices only to
an extent normal and usual for the particular area involved."'70 In Southwest
Livestock, the Tyler court of appeals concluded that "[i]t should not be con-
sidered normal, usual or natural to find odoriferous livestock pens situated in
such close proximity to urban land uses ....
Similarly, the Eastland court of appeals in FIR Cattle Company rejected
the company's argument that its facility was normal and usual in the area
and vicinity.72 Instead, the court held that the company's interpretation of
Europak and Southwest Livestock was too narrow because the location is not
the only factor that determines if a facility is normal or usual and, therefore,
produced by natural processes. 73 On this basis, the court rejected the argu-
ment that the facility should be considered normal and usual because it was
located in a dairy region:
We hold that it is abnormal and unusual, without regard to location, to
concentrate approximately 6,000 baby calves in 1,500 small hutches and
in weaning pens .... The odor at the defendant's calf feeding facility
was not produced by natural processes. The trial court erred in dis-
missing the State's petition. The Texas Clean Air Act is applicable, and
the Texas Air Control Board has jurisdiction.74
E. TEXAS AIR CONTROL BOARD STANDARD EXEMPTION FROM
PERMIT REQUIREMENTS Is NOT A DEFENSE TO A CRIMINAL
ACTION FOR AIR POLLUTION
In Southwest Utilities, Inc. v. State,75 the Corpus Christi court of appeals
ruled that a sewage facility's exemption from the Texas Air Control Board
(TACB) permit requirements was not a defense to a criminal action under
section 382.091(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code.76 At the time, sec-
tion 382.091(a)77 provided that "[a] person may not cause or permit the
68. Europak, 507 S.W.2d at 885.
69. Southwest Livestock, 579 S.W.2d at 549.
70. Europak, 507 S.W.2d at 891.
71. Southwest Livestock, 579 S.W.2d at 552.
72. FIR Cattle Company, 828 S.W.2d at 307.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 822 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd).
76. Id.
77. This section has since been severely amended. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
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emission of an air contaminant that causes or that will cause air pollution
unless the emission is made in compliance with a variance or other order
issued by the [Texas air control] board."'78 In this case, Southwest Utilities,
Inc. (Southwest) owned a sewage treatment facility near a residential area.
The State filed a criminal action against Southwest and alleged and produced
evidence at trial showing that on four occasions the plant emitted an odor
strong enough to interfere with the normal use and enjoyment of the sur-
rounding residential property. The jury found Southwest guilty on all four
counts of air pollution and the court assessed punishment of four fines of
$750.00 plus court costs. 79
On appeal, Southwest argued that it was in compliance with a variance or
other order issued by the board, and thus, exempt from criminal liability for
its emission of air contaminants. Southwest argued that it was in compli-
ance because its facility qualified as a sewage treatment facility exempt from
TACB permit requirements under a TACB standard exemption.80 The
court acknowledged that the sewage treatment facility was exempt from a
TACB permit requirement,8 ' but rejected the argument that an exemption
from permitting also exempts the facility from criminal prosecution.
[The rule] merely eliminates the requirement that appellant acquire a
permit before emitting air contaminants. It does not eliminate the
§ 382.091(a) requirement that emission of air contaminants must be in
compliance with a variance or order of the Air Control Board. Thus,
being exempt from permit requirements under Rule 116.6(a), or any
order not relating to emissions, is not a defense to a criminal action
under § 382.091(a). Rule 116.6(b) implicitly so provides.8 2
It is not clear if the holding of Southwest Utilities will have any vitality
beyond its impact on Southwest. Section 382.091, under which Southwest
was convicted, has been so thoroughly amended that it is unlikely that the
issues raised in Southwest Utilities will be presented in identical form again.83
Section 382.091 no longer includes the phrase that Southwest unsuccessfully
attempted to use as an affirmative defense. Instead, criminal liability now
§ 382.091(a) (Vernon 1992). The change in law, however, applies only to an offense commit-
ted on or after the effective date of the amendment (September 1, 1991). Id.
78. Southwest Utilities, 822 S.W.2d at 752.
79. Id.
80. The facilities or types of facilities listed in the TACB's Standard Exemption list are
exempt from permit requirements provided that they meet certain other conditions. See Tex.
Air Control Board, 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.6(a) (West Aug. 11, 1989).
81. Southwest Utilities, 822 S.W.2d at 753 n.3.
82. Id. at 753. Section 116.6(b) has also been amended. The provision now states: "The
emissions from the facility shall comply with all rules and regulations of the Texas Air Control
Board (TACB) and with the intent of the TCAA [Texas Clean Air Act], including protection
of health and property of the public .... " Id. at 752 n.2.
83. Section 382.091 now reads in relevant part:
(a) A person commits an offense if the person:
(1) intentionally or knowingly, with respect to the person's conduct,
violates:
(E) an order, permit, rule, or exemption issued under this chapter ....
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.091 (Vernon 1992).
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hinges on whether the company violated "an order, permit, rule or exemp-
tion," with no affirmative defense for compliance with a variance.8s4 Thus,
Southwest's affirmative defense argument is unlikely to be raised under the
section as amended.8 5
F. TACB DIRECTOR'S LETTER AN ACT OF THE BOARD FOR PURPOSES
OF THE STATUTE REQUIRING THAT A PERSON WISHING TO
APPEAL RULING OF THE BOARD MUST FILE A
PETITION IN TRAVIS COUNTY
In Spaw v. W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn. ,86 the Fort Worth court of appeals
held that the validity of the Executive Director's acting for the TACB was a
matter for the district court of Travis County to determine.87 The Executive
Director (Spaw) wrote a letter to W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. (Grace) chang-
ing the date by which Grace was to install certain air pollution control
equipment at a plant Grace operated in Tarrant County. The date in the
Spaw letter conflicted with the date already set in an agreed order between
the TACB and Grace.
A district court in Tarrant County issued a temporary injunction prohibit-
ing Spaw from enforcing the letter and from attempting to modify the agreed
order of the TACB. 8  The court of appeals reversed the temporary injunc-
tion and dismissed the cause for want of jurisdiction.8 9 The basis for the
dismissal is the court's holding that the Texas Health and Safety Code estab-
lishes jurisdiction to determine the validity of Spaw's letter in the district
courts of Travis County.90 The Code states that "a person affected by a
ruling, order, decision, or other act of the [Texas Air Control] board may
appeal the action by filing a petition in a district court of Travis County." 91
The court of appeals rejected Grace's argument that Spaw's letter was not
an act of the board by holding that "such a letter, written ... pursuant to
authority granted by a Board order, is an act of the Board for the purposes
of Section 382.032(a), even if such letter conflicts in some way with some
other order of the Board." 92 The court of appeals concluded that the Execu-
tive Director is generally authorized by the TACB to issue such letters, and
84. Id.
85. In addition, there are likely to be few arguments in the future concerning whether a
standard exemption qualifies a facility to be in compliance with a variance or board order
because many standard exemptions will be eliminated. The federal Clean Air Act, as amended
in 1990, will require many facilities now operating under standard exemptions to obtain federal
operating permits, which will eliminate many standard exemptions. Finn, TACB Permitting
Process, paper presented at the 4th Annual Texas Environmental Superconference, Aug. 6-7,
1992. Section 382.091 provides that intentional or knowing violation of the federal operating
permit requirements is punishable as a criminal offense. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 382.091(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 1992).
86. 815 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1991, no writ).
87. Id. at 908.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 909.
90. Id.
91. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.032 (Vernon 1992).
92. 815 S.W.2d at 909.
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noted that the date set in the agreed order was originally provided in a simi-
lar letter written by Spaw, the contents of which were incorporated into the
agreed order. 93
G. PARTY STATUS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONFER STANDING TO APPEAL AGENCY'S
DECISION IN DISTRICT COURT
Superior Sand & Gravel Company applied to the Texas Parks and Wild-
life Commission (Commission) for a permit to dredge sand and gravel from
a part of the Brazos River on the boundary of Fort Bend County (County) in
Ft. Bend County v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Comm'n.94 The Commission
held hearings on the application at which the County was granted party
status. When the Commission issued the permit, the County filed suit in
district court of Travis County, seeking judicial review of the decision. Su-
perior Sand & Gravel Company intervened and filed a plea in abatement
challenging the County's standing to maintain an administrative appeal. Af-
ter a hearing, the district court granted the plea in abatement and dismissed
the suit.95
The Austin court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.96 The
significance of the court of appeals' opinion is that it distinguishes the re-
quirements for party status in an agency proceeding from the requirements
for party status to obtain judicial review of the agency's decision. Under the
regulations of the Commission, party status only requires the showing of a
justifiable interest. 97 "As a matter of policy, the right to participate in
agency proceedings is liberally construed to allow the agency the benefits of
diverse viewpoints."' 98 In contrast, the Texas Administrative Procedure and
Texas Register Act provides that the district court must determine if the
person seeking party status is "[a] person . . . who is aggrieved by a final
decision in a contested case .... 99 The court of appeals stated that "[t]he
requirements for standing at the agency and standing before the court are
different .... [t]herefore, standing to participate in the agency hearing does
not necessarily confer standing to appeal the agency's decision in district
court.' ' 10 0
This is an unusual case because its outcome was predetermined by the
County's procedural errors at both the trial and appellate stages. First, in
district court the County failed to offer the agency record into evidence at
the hearing, as required by the Texas Administrative Procedure and Texas
93. Id.
94. 818 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
95. Id. at 899.
96. Id. at 900.
97. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dept., 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 51.30 (West April 1, 1992).
98. Fort Bend County, 818 S.W.2d at 899 (quoting Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Ennis
Transp. Co., 695 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
99. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(a) (Supp. 1993).
100. Fort Bend County, 818 S.W.2d at 899.
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Register Act.' 0 Thus, the agency record was not available to either the
district court or the court of appeals.
In addition, the County apparently failed to bring forward a statement of
facts from the hearing or findings of fact by the trial court, because the ap-
pellate record did not contain a statement of facts or findings of fact. Thus,
the County failed to meet its burden to bring forward a record on appeal that
demonstrated the error about which it complained. 10 2 Because no record
was available to the court of appeals, it had to assume that the evidence at
the hearing in district court supported the district court's judgment. 103
101. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
102. TEX. R. ApP. P. 50(d).
103. Fort Bend County, 818 S.W.2d at 900.
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